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15	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
16	COUNTY OF LOS	ANGELES
17	PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,	Case No. SA073164
18 19 20 21	Plaintiff, v.	DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR RESTRICTION ON PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
22	CONRAD MURRAY,	
23 24 25 26	Defendant, MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA,	Date: April 5, 2010 Time: 1:30 a.m. Dept: 100 Judge: Honorable Peter Espinoza
27	Applicant.	
28		
29	TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COU	RT:
30	COMES NOW the Defendant, CONF	RAD MURRAY, in response to the
31	Attorney's General's request for restriction on practice of medicine, requesting that this	
32	Court deny the Attorney General's request. In support, Defendant would show unto the	
33	Court the following:	

Pertinent Facts

35 Defendant Conrad Murray is a licensed physician in California. He further holds 36 licenses to practice medicine in Nevada and Texas. On February 8, 2010, Defendant was 37 arraigned in Los Angeles Superior Court, Department 144, with Honorable Keith 38 Schwartz presiding, for the offense of Involuntary Manslaughter. (Pen. Code § 192(b).) 39 At that time, the Attorney General appeared through its Assistant Attorney General, Trina 40 Sanders, and filed a Motion requesting that the court prohibit Conrad Murray from 41 practicing medicine during the pendency of the court case (said Motion is attached as 42 Exhibit "A"). A hearing was held without witnesses and Judge Schwartz considered both 43 the Attorney General's request for bail conditions and the People's request for a deviation 44 from the scheduled bail amount.

After arguments of counsel, Judge Schwartz refused the request of the Attorney General to prohibit Defendant from practicing medicine. However, the Judge did order that Defendant limit his practice. Specifically, Judge Schwartz ordered that Defendant 1) not prescribe or administer anesthetic agents such as Propofol and 2) not personally sedate patients. Bail was set at \$75,000, which was immediately posted by Defendant (docketed order is attached as Exhibit "B"). Defendant has complied with all conditions set by Judge Schwartz and has made appearances at all required court settings.

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Pertinent Law and Argument

53 The California Medical Board, through the Attorney General, makes its 54 appearance under its presumed authority under California Penal Code 23 to make 55 recommendations regarding conditions of probation or provide the court assistance in fact 56 finding. That code section allows a state agency that has issued a license to a criminal 57 defendant to appear in the criminal matter "to furnish pertinent information, make 58 recommendations regarding specific conditions of probation, or provide any other 59 assistance necessary to promote the interests of justice and protect the interests of the 60 public . . . if the crime charged is substantially related to the qualifications, functions or 61 duties of a licensee." (Pen. Code § 23.) It is not at all clear that this permits a licensing 62 authority to make recommendations as to bail conditions. (Grav v. Superior Court, (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 629, 643.) 63

On behalf of the Medical Board, the Attorney General asks his Honor to alter the conditions of bail already set by Judge Schwartz on February 8, 2010. In this request, the Attorney General relies on §1275 and §1289 of the California Penal Code. (Pen. Code §§ 1275 & 1289.) There is no specific code section that relates to modifications of conditions of felony bail *per se*. The Attorney General assumes that these two code sections relate to bail conditions as well, and so shall we. (see also *In Re McSherry*, (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 856, 859-863.)

71

Requirement of Changed Conditions

California Penal Code §1289 allows his Honor to amend conditions of bail or increase bail upon a showing of good cause shown. (Pen. Code § 1289.) However, "different policy considerations are operative if *the reconsideration is to be accomplished by a different judge*." (*In re Annis*, (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196 (emphasis added); *In re Alberto*, (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 427; see *Greene v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.*, (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1583, 1588.) As noted in *Alberto*, a subsequent Judge cannot change bail unless good cause is *predicated on "changed circumstances."* (*supra*, at 532 (emphasis added).) It cannot be based on a conclusion by the subsequent Judge that the first Judge simply got it wrong. (*Ibid*.)

The Attorney General makes no claim that circumstances have changed with regard to the State of California or Defendant. In fact, there is no information presented to his Honor that Defendant has seen or treated any patients in California since his arraignment on February 8, 2010. It was made clear at the arraignment setting that Defendant has no medical offices in the State of California. Additionally, Defendant has no intention to see or treat any patients in California or undertake the expense of opening a new practice or relocate either of his two offices in Nevada or Houston.

It is alleged by the Attorney General that further restriction on Defendant's ability to practice medicine is necessary for the protection of California's citizens, but he has given the Court no information that this protection is any more important than it was at the time of the initial bail decision by Judge Schwartz. Further, the Attorney General has presented no evidence that Defendant has violated any of the restrictions already placed on his ability to practice medicine.

In effect, what the Attorney General seeks to do is to take another bite at the apple, albeit this time with a different Judge. Prevention of this practice is precisely the reasoning given by the Appeals court in *Alberto* for requiring the showing of changed circumstances. As the Appeals Court noted, to require otherwise "would lead directly to forum shopping, since if one judge should deny relief, defendant's would try another and another judge until they found one who would grant what they were seeking." (*Id.* at529.)

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Procedural Due Process

103 As noted in the declaration by Trina Saunders, the Deputy Attorney assigned to 104 this case, there are procedures by which the Medical Board of California must follow to 105 take away a valuable property right such as a medical license. (Declaration, p. 2:11-23.) 106 The Attorney General's reasoning for asking the Court to do an act tantamount to taking 107 away this property right is because "unless a criminal conviction is obtained, the Board 108 would have to put on the same evidence, witnesses and exhibits that must be used in this 109 criminal proceeding in order to prove the charges. This would involve considerable 110 expense for the Board." (Id. (emphasis added).)

Without question this would involve expense and effort. Procedural due process often does. However, the California and United States Constitutions do require due process and at a minimum this means a hearing before an impartial forum. (U.S. Const. 14 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. I § 7.)

115 The question of whether a Superior Court may prohibit a physician from 116 practicing as a condition of bail has been firmly decided by the 1st District Court of 117 Appeals of California in <u>Gray v. Superior Court</u>, 125 Cal.App.4th 629

In *Gray*, as in this case, the Attorney General made an appearance on behalf of the Medical Board and requested that Gray, a licensed physician in the State of California, be forbidden from practicing medicine during the pendency of his case for several felonies, including charges of possessing a controlled substance and sexually exploiting a former patient. The reasoning given by the Attorney General was strikingly similar to the reasoning given in this case. The Judge in *Gray* acquiesced to the Attorney General's demands and prohibited Dr. Gray from practicing medicine as a condition of bail. Gray filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus , which was denied by another Superior Court. Gray appealed.

127 The Appeals Court recognized that a medical license was a cognizable property 128 interest. (*Id.* at 54; quoting *Smith v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance*, (1988) 202 129 Cal.App.3d 316, 326.) Further, the Appeals Court held that before this property interest 130 was taken from a physician he must be provided adequate procedural due process. (*Gray*, 131 supra, at 56.)

For purposes of a due process analysis, the Appeals Court found no meaningful distinction between a license suspension and an order prohibiting a licensee from engaging in the profession for which the person is licensed. (*Id.* at 54 n.4.) The Court of Appeals vacated the Judge's order, stating, "The trial court significantly impaired Gray's freedom to pursue a private occupation without giving him notice, an effective opportunity to confront the charges or witnesses against him, or a full hearing, in violation of his due process rights." (*Id.* at 55.)

Essentially, what the Attorney General is asking this Court to do is what they were uncategorically denied the ability to do in previous cases. He wants this Court to take away Defendant's medical license so that the Medical Board does not have to go through the trouble. Assuming arguendo, that the Attorney General has authority to make this request, and assuming arguendo that the Court has authority to change a prior Judge's bail decision without any recognizable change in circumstances, it must at least be admitted by the Attorney General that the United States and California Constitutions must be adhered to before this modification is permitted.

Denial of the Medical Board's request does not mean that the Medical Board is left impotent. As was noted in *Gray*, the Medical Board has procedures available to it to take the license of a medical professional, outside of the criminal arena. (*Id.* at 59; citing Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2236.1, 2237, 2239.) Further, upon conviction the Board may seize a medical license. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 2236.) However, under the Bus. & Prof. Code rules, the mere filing of a criminal complaint is not sufficient. (*Gray*, supra, at 59.)

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The Practical Effect on the Criminal Case

As a practical matter, an order that prohibits Defendant from practicing medicine in California will have no effect on the citizens of California. Dr. Murray has not seen patients in California for over eight months and does not presently intend to practice in the state any time soon. The order would be a shallow one, designed only to prove a point rather than make a difference.

However, with regard to Dr. Murray, the effect of such a prohibition on his medical practice would be financially and personally devastating. As the California Medical Board and Attorney General well know, other states may, and in some circumstances must, use his Honor's order to institute administrative action against Dr. Murray. This domino effect is insured by the reciprocity rules that govern the Medical Boards in those states.

165	In Texas, Texas Occupations Code §164.051 states in relevant part as follows:	
166 167 168 169	(d) The [Texas Medical Board] <i>shall</i> revoke a license issued under this subtitle [e.g. medicine] if the license holder held a license to practice medicine in another state that has been revoked by the licensing authority in that state.	
170	(Tex. Occ. Code § 164.051(d) (Vernon 2010) (emphasis added).) If his Honor restricts	
171	his California license even temporarily, then by application of Texas law, Dr. Murray's	
172	Texas license to practice medicine shall also be similarly revoked.	
173	Based upon the earlier bail restrictions on licensure by Judge Schwartz, the Texas	
174	Medical Board, through the authority of Tex. Occ. Code § $164.051(a)(9)^1$ has already	
175	taken steps to obtain an order restricting his Texas medical license (see draft order,	
176	Exhibit "C"). It is highly likely that further limitations to Dr. Murray's license will	
177	influence the Texas Medical Board to follow suit.	
178	Similar action may take place in Nevada wherein Nevada Revised Statute §	
179	630.301(3) states in relevant part as follows:	
180 181	Criminal offenses; disciplinary action taken by other jurisdiction;	
182 183	The following acts, among others, constitute grounds for initiating disciplinary action or denying licensure	
184 185 186 187	3. Any disciplinary action, including, without limitation, the revocation, suspension, modification or limitation of a license to practice any type of medicine, taken by another state	
188 189	(Nev. Rev. Stat. § 630.301 (2007).)	

¹ "GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OR DISCIPLINARY ACTION. (a) The [Texas Medical Board] may refuse to admit a person to its examination or refuse to issue a license to practice medicine and may take disciplinary action against a person if the person:(9) except as provided by Subsection (d), holds a license to practice medicine subject to disciplinary action by another state" (Tex. Occ. Code § 164.051(a)(9).)

By the requirements of self-reporting in Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 630.3068 & 630.307, the Nevada Medical Board has already been notified by Dr. Murray of the restrictions on his license by virtue of the bail requirements already in place. It is anticipated that the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners will take action due to these bail requirements. In fact, the Nevada Board has already filed notice of restrictions based on child support issues.

Given that there is no threat to the public that would be alleviated by Dr. Murray's suspension of practice in California, there is no need for further bail conditions affecting Dr. Murray's license. This would immediately affect his ability to practice in Nevada and Texas, to usurp these states' abilities to make decisions for their own citizens, and also to thereby destroy Dr. Murray's ability to make a living, to pay his child support, to pay his employees, and to positively affect his patients in these states.

Perhaps most important to the Superior Court, if Dr. Murray is unable to practice 202 203 medicine in Texas, and especially Nevada, he will likely be faced with the inability to 204 adequately defend himself of the charges facing him in the Superior Court of California. 205 The case with which he is charged will require intensive attorney work and fees. In light 206 of the fact that much of his defense will be scientifically based and involves the death of 207 an internationally famous decedent, expenses for his defense will be considerable. Dr. 208 Murray's financial difficulties as a result of the investigation into this case have already 209 been well publicized. He is, without fear of overstatement, hanging on by a thread. His 210 ability to pay for his own defense depends almost entirely on his ability to continue to 211 treat patients in Nevada and Texas.

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212	CONCLUSION
213	For the foregoing reasons, Defendant, Conrad Murray, M.D., respectfully requests
214	that this Court deny the request of Applicant Linda K. Whitney, Interim Executive
215	Director of the Medical Board of California, to impose a prohibition on Dr. Murray's
216	practice of medicine as a condition of bail.
217	Dated: March 31, 2010
218	Respectfully submitted
219	
220	EDWARD M. CHERNOFF
221	Attorney for Defendant
222	
223	JOSEPH H. LOW IV
224	Attorney for Defendant
