Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism
Report Card

An Assessment of the U.S. Government’s Progress in Protecting the United States from Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism

January 2010

Bob Graham, Chairman • Jim Talent, Vice Chairman

Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism
Dear Speaker Pelosi, Majority Leader Reid, Minority Leader Boehner, and Minority Leader McConnell:


That report assessed the nation’s activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism and provided concrete recommendations to address these threats.

The Commission found several areas where the risks to the United States are increasing: the crossroads of terrorism and proliferation in the poorly governed regions of Pakistan, the proliferation of biological and nuclear materials, and technology, and the potential erosion of international nuclear security, treaties, and norms as we enter a nuclear energy renaissance.

In 2009, the Commission was authorized for an additional year of work, to assist Congress and the Administration to improve understanding of its findings and turn its concrete recommendations into actions.

In accordance with that authorization, the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, based upon close consultation with Commissioners, hereby submit a report card assessing the U.S. Government’s progress in protecting the United States from weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.

This report card provides an assessment of the progress that the U.S. government has made in implementing the recommendations of the Commission. It is our hope that by identifying areas of progress, as well as those in need of further attention, appropriate action will be taken to mitigate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction to the United States.

We thank you for the opportunity to extend the work of the Commission and for the honor of allowing us to serve our country.

Respectfully submitted,

Senator Bob Graham  
*Chairman*

Senator Jim Talent  
*Vice Chairman*
Dear Mr. President:


That report assessed the nation’s activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism and provided concrete recommendations to address these threats.

The Commission found several areas where the risks to the United States are increasing: the crossroads of terrorism and proliferation in the poorly governed regions of Pakistan, the proliferation of biological and nuclear materials, and technology, and the potential erosion of international nuclear security, treaties, and norms as we enter a nuclear energy renaissance.

In 2009, the Commission was authorized for an additional year of work, to assist Congress and the Administration to improve understanding of its findings and turn its concrete recommendations into actions.

In accordance with that authorization, the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, based upon close consultation with Commissioners, hereby submit a report card assessing the U.S. Government’s progress in protecting the United States from weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.

This report card provides an assessment of the progress that the U.S. government has made in implementing the recommendations of the Commission. It is our hope that by identifying areas of progress, as well as those in need of further attention, appropriate action will be taken to mitigate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction to the United States.

We thank you for the opportunity to extend the work of the Commission and for the honor of allowing us to serve our country.

Respectfully submitted,

Senator Bob Graham  
*Chairman*

Senator Jim Talent  
*Vice Chairman*
Overview

In December 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism released a unanimous threat assessment: Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. That weapon is more likely to be biological than nuclear.

Less than a month after this assessment, then Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell publicly endorsed it.

The assessment was based on four factors.

- First, there is direct evidence that terrorists are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

- Second, acquiring WMD fits the tactical profile of terrorists. They understand the unique vulnerability of first-world countries to asymmetric weapons—weapons that have a far greater destructive impact than the power it takes to acquire and deploy them. The airplanes that al Qaeda flew into the World Trade Center were asymmetric weapons.

- Third, terrorists have demonstrated global reach and the organizational sophistication to obtain and use WMD. As recent actions by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula demonstrate, the al Qaeda network is expanding through international partnerships. In particular, it is well within their present capabilities to develop and use bioweapons. As the Commission’s report, World at Risk, found, if al Qaeda recruits skilled bioscientists, it will acquire the capability to develop and use biological weapons.

- Fourth, the opportunity to acquire and use such weapons is growing exponentially because of the global proliferation of nuclear material and biological technologies.

Almost fourteen months have passed since the Commission issued its World at Risk. That means nearly a quarter of the five-year margin of shrinking safety has passed.

During that time, the risk has continued to grow.

This is not meant to question the good faith or deny the dedication of anyone in the government. The fact is that first-world democracies are particular vulnerable to asymmetric attack, especially from organizations that have no national base and therefore, are undeterred by the threat of retaliation. So although everyone wants to prevent such attacks, and the government made progress toward that end in certain areas, the forces and factors that imperil the country have been outracing defensive efforts and overwhelming good intentions.

It is possible that fortuitous circumstances may reduce the anticipated risk. Outside forces may change and render more benign the groups that are working against us, or as in the case of the Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day, an attack may occur but fail in execution to the point that the destructive impact is minimal.

But the United States cannot count on such good fortune. Plans must be based on the assumption that what is likely to occur, given the current trajectory of risk, WILL occur, unless the trajectory is reversed. And on the
current course, what is likely to occur within a very few years is an attack using weapons of mass destruction—probably a bioweapon—that will fundamentally change the character of life for the world’s democracies.

In reaction to the Christmas Day attack, President Barack Obama stated that he would do everything in his power to support the men and women in intelligence, law enforcement and homeland security to ensure they have the tools and resources to keep America safe. He promised to “leave no stone unturned in seeking better ways to protect the American people.” It is in this spirit of protecting America that the Commission made its recommendations, and it is in this spirit that the report card was developed.

The assessment is not a good one, particularly in the area of biological threats. While the government has made progress on preventing such attacks, it is simply not paying consistent and urgent attention to the means of responding quickly and effectively so that they no longer constitute a threat of mass destruction. The failures did not begin with the current group of leaders. Each of the last three Administrations has been slow to recognize and respond to the biothreat. The difference is that the danger has grown to the point that we no longer have the luxury of a slow learning curve. The clock is ticking, and time is running out.

Failure to Understand Nature of Biothreat
The evolution of the nature of the threat is nowhere more pronounced than in the area of biological weapons. A revolution in biotechnology continues, expanding potentially dangerous dual-use capabilities across the globe. As the delayed response to H1N1 has demonstrated, the United States is woefully behind in its capability to rapidly produce vaccines and therapeutics, essential steps for adequately responding to a biological threat, whether natural or man-made.

H1N1 came with months of warning. But even with time to prepare, the epidemic peaked before most Americans had access to vaccine. A bioattack will come with no such warning. Response is a complex series of links in a chain of resilience necessary to protect the United States from biological attacks. Rapid detection and diagnosis capabilities are the first links, followed by providing actionable information to federal, state, and local leaders and the general public; having adequate supplies of appropriate medical countermeasures; quickly distributing those countermeasures; treating and isolating the sick in medical facilities; protecting the well through vaccines and prophylactic medications; and in certain cases, such as anthrax, environmental cleanup. We conclude that virtually all links are weak, and require the highest priority of attention from the Administration and Congress.

The Chair and Vice Chair believe that this lack of preparedness and a consistent lack of action, even on fundamental issues like provision of adequate high-level expertise and investment in medical countermeasures, is a symptom of a failure of the U.S. government to grasp the threat of biological weapons.

Whereas the Administration has demonstrated a keen understanding of the nuclear threat and has set in motion a series of policies that all hope will bear fruit, there has been no equal sense of urgency displayed towards the threat of a large-scale biological weapons attack.

Positive Strides to Address Nuclear Threat
President Obama has undertaken substantial effort to bolster the nonproliferation regime. From his April 2009 speech in Prague to his chairmanship of a United Nations Security Council meeting on the subject and plans for a Global Summit on Nuclear Security, he is attempting to bend current trend lines.
We have some concerns in the nuclear arena, particularly regarding the Administration’s failure to prevent the lapse of verification mechanisms established under the START treaty. Ensuring their continuation was very important and insufficient attention was paid to it.

The U.S. government has placed priority on Iran and North Korea, and much attention and resources have been spent on Pakistan, but progress has been slow. The Chair and Vice Chair are gravely concerned about these regions. Recognizing the limited leverage the United States has in addressing them and the time-consuming nature of diplomacy, as the Administration works to deepen global resolve to act, we underscore the unacceptable consequences of failure.

The U.S. government must strengthen the nonproliferation regime, develop more effective policies to eliminate terrorist havens in Pakistan, and galvanize allies to stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs.

**Iran and North Korea**

No grade is provided for Iran and North Korea in recognition if the broad nature and ambition of the Commission’s recommendation to “stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs.” In *World at Risk*, the Commission stated that because of the dynamic international environment, it would not address the precise tactics that should be employed by the next administration to achieve this strategic objective. However, the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea pose immediate and urgent threats to their respective regions and to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which could trigger a dangerous cascade of proliferation.

The actions of both countries in the past year have only increased these threats. Iran has rebuffed negotiating efforts, been exposed in its pursuit of a covert uranium enrichment site, and stated its intention to build additional facilities in defiance of UN Security Council mandates. It has also violently crushed its own domestic political opposition. North Korea has conducted both nuclear and missile tests. With Iran, the Administration has reacted with extreme patience but now appears poised to push for strengthened sanctions (a step supported by the House of Representatives in a sanctions bill passed in December 2009). Regarding North Korea, the Administration succeeded in tightening multilateral sanctions on the country with Security Council Resolution 1874, but direct diplomatic engagement has failed to bring North Korea back into the six-nation talks. The Commission is deeply concerned with these events and the time that has been lost in 2009. Failure to stop Iran and North Korea could result in a cascade of proliferation, which would dramatically increase the likelihood of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

**Failure on Government Reform and Building a National Security Workforce**

As former members of the U.S. Senate, the Chair and Vice Chair are enormously frustrated at the inability of Congress to reform its own oversight of the nation’s homeland security agency.

The Chair and Vice Chair recognize the immense domestic challenges faced by Congress and the new Administration over the past year, including the financial crisis and health care reform, but believes that there should have been room for the structural procedures necessary to face the critical national security issue of protecting Americans from WMD threats.

As an independent branch of the U.S. government, Congress has an essential role to play in ensuring our national security—through authorization, appropriation, and oversight. It is essential to the safety of the American citizen that these functions are carried out competently.
For instance, the authorization, appropriation, and oversight for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are spread across more than 80 committees and subcommittees. This ensures that Congress will continue to lack a deep understanding of the important and interrelated security and intelligence policy issues that face the nation. This fragmentation guarantees that much of what Congress does will be duplicative and disjointed.

Oversight of DHS should be removed from legacy committees and focused within the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees.

The refusal of Congress, as the nation’s elected representatives, to pull congressional authority together into one coherent oversight body is both self-serving and conspicuous, suggesting that individual concerns for “turf” supersede the legislature’s willingness to assume responsibility to ensure national security.

Although the executive branch has made improvements in integrating the efforts of various departments and agencies, much work remains, as demonstrated by the Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day. That thwarted attack exposed not only the inability of various intelligence agencies to provide protection, but also the inability of Congress to provide oversight.

In addition, both the Administration and Congress are well aware of the need to substantially improve how our federal departments, agencies, and the national laboratories hire and retain highly skilled personnel. The aging of our national security workforce has been a growing problem for over a decade, and yet little has been done by either branch of government.

If these long-standing deficiencies in executive agency operations and congressional oversight of homeland security, intelligence, and other crosscutting 21st century issues are not corrected, the United States will remain woefully underprepared to respond to the growing WMD threat.

The Commission emphasized in World at Risk that there is a vital connection between the process of making decisions and decisions made, or not made. In other words, if the process is balkanized; if there are no “integrators” to make sure agencies or committees work together; if experienced, senior officials are not put into the crucial positions, then the people can expect that little or nothing will be done—despite the good will of top authorities.

**Progress on Citizen and Community Preparedness**

A well-informed, organized, and engaged citizenry remains the country’s greatest resource. The federal government has made some progress in supporting the development of preparedness and resilience of state and local governments, business and non-profit communities, and individual citizens. Efforts, such as development of a checklist that citizens can use to ensure the readiness of their local governments, need to be expanded to ensure that all communities and citizens are prepared in the event of a WMD attack.
Grading System

This report card uses letter grades to assess the U.S. government’s progress in implementing the Commission’s recommendations. The grades are based on close consultation with Commissioners, but the final assessments are those of the Chair and Vice Chair.

The letter grades take into consideration the scope of the recommendations and assess the level of attention paid, commitment demonstrated, and actual steps taken. The grades reflect the level of progress based upon what is both realistic and essential, given the urgency and complexity of the threats the country faces. Each grade is accompanied by text that discusses key details, considers the long-term nature of some goals, and offers recommended actions that can lead to significant improvement.

Some of our recommendations can be implemented by the President making a decision or the President and Congress passing a law or appropriating money. Others require working with foreign governments to persuade them to change their attitudes and behavior. Our grades reflect an appreciation of this difference.

Grades are not provided for every one of the 13 recommendations and 49 actions outlined in World at Risk. Rather, 17 grades are given, highlighting the issues of highest priority for protecting the American people from WMD threats. They are grouped into four main areas: Biological Risk, Nuclear Risk, Government Reform, and Citizen Engagement. Within each area the recommendations are listed in order of weighted importance, with those of the highest priority appearing first. The full 13 recommendations from World at Risk are provided starting on page 15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Recommendations fully adopted or significant steps taken towards implementation of longer term goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Serious action taken/commitment demonstrated, not yet complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Initial steps taken, but significant follow-up action required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Limited initial steps (e.g., action limited to one committee or chamber of Congress)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>No attention or action taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Incomplete—not realistic to assess in the timeframe allowed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Biological Risks

Enhance the nation’s capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties.

World at Risk recommendation 1-5

The lack of U.S. capability to rapidly recognize, respond, and recover from a biological attack is the most significant failure identified in this report card. Deterrence of bioterrorism rests upon the ability of the nation to mitigate the effects of an attack. Unfortunately, there is no national plan to coordinate federal, state, and local efforts following a bioterror attack, and the United States lacks the technical and operational capabilities required for an adequate response. These technical and operational capabilities are each links in a chain, critical to the strength of the attack response. Weakness in any capability leads to a diminished response, and diminished effectiveness in deterring an attack.

Rapid detection and diagnosis capabilities are the first links in the chain, followed by: providing actionable information to federal, state, and local leaders and the general public; having adequate supplies of appropriate medical countermeasures; quickly distributing those countermeasures; treating and isolating the sick in medical facilities; protecting the well through vaccines and prophylactic medications; and in certain cases, such as anthrax, environmental cleanup.

The United States is seriously lacking in each of these vital capabilities.

Especially troubling is the lack of priority given to the development of medical countermeasures—the vaccines and medicines that would be required to mitigate the consequences of an attack. Congress created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority Advanced Development Fund to promote the development of new vaccines, drugs, and production processes required to meet the modern threats from man-made and naturally occurring epidemics. The estimated cost of developing the medical countermeasures required to meet the threats identified by the Department of Homeland Security is $3.4 billion a year for the next five years. Appropriation for FY 2010 is less than one tenth of that. In addition, there have been several attempts by the Administration and Congress to “raid” the BioShield Strategic Reserve Fund for programs not associated with national security.

In World at Risk, the Commission unanimously concluded that bioterrorism was the most likely WMD threat to the world. The capability to deter and respond to bioterrorism depends upon the strength of all links in the biodefense chain. Virtually all links are weak and require the highest priority of attention from the Administration and Congress.

Improving the capabilities to rapidly recognize, respond, and recover from a bioterrorism attack has great dual-benefit in that it will significantly enhance public health infrastructures and medical capacities to deal with naturally occurring diseases and other disasters.
Tighten government oversight of high-containment laboratories.
World at Risk recommendation 1-3

The Commission recommended that government oversight be tightened so that governmental policies are consistent, enforceable, and promote important bioscience research. However, regulatory fragmentation remains the norm. There are too many agencies at the federal, state, and local levels that regulate pathogens, in sometimes conflicting ways. Congress bears primary responsibility for the needed reforms to tighten the oversight of these dangerous pathogens.

Following the Commission’s recommendation for a review of the domestic program, many government, academic, associations, and private sector studies came to similar conclusions regarding the importance of eliminating duplicative regulations, and organizing pathogens into risk categories. Most agree that the highest risk pathogens, deserving the most stringent controls, number closer to eight than the 80 pathogens currently on the Select Agent List.

The Senate Homeland Security and Government Reform Committee has acted on the Commission’s recommendations in the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009. We applaud its efforts to address laboratory security. But work by one Committee in one House of Congress does not represent the kind of urgent and comprehensive action that World at Risk called for. The full Senate should take up the Committee Bill, a companion bill should be introduced and moved quickly through the House, and both bodies should act expeditiously in considering and resolving the inevitable differences of opinion that arise in the passage of such legislation.

As stated in World at Risk, the Commission is firm in its conclusion that the Secretary of Health and Human Services should have the lead for laboratory security of human pathogens.

A Presidential directive could be used to improve some of these deficiencies.

Conduct a comprehensive review of the domestic program to secure dangerous pathogens.
World at Risk recommendation 1-1

The Administration has completed several reports since the Commission made its recommendations in December 2008, focusing on many of the areas identified for security review, including laboratory security, reliability and trustworthiness of employees who have access to dangerous pathogens and research facilities, and federal oversight of high-containment laboratory research. This was a specific recommendation in the report, and we are pleased that it was quickly accomplished. But reports and reviews alone will not protect us; the next step is to integrate and implement the conclusions of these reports into a national strategy that ensures laboratory safety and security without impeding the pace of scientific progress.

Strengthen domestic and global disease surveillance networks.
World at Risk recommendations 2-3 & 1-5

The nation’s ability to recognize a disease emergency—whether it is man-made or naturally occurring—is the first link in a chain that leads to a robust public health response. Once a disease is detected, important
information about the disease must be rapidly communicated to all those who are susceptible. The sick must be treated, the well protected, and the outbreak eventually contained. If any part of this chain is weak or broken, as it currently is, an adequate response is not possible. Surveillance is a key part of biodefense preparedness because it would help reduce the impact of an attack. The *WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009* addresses many of the Commission’s concerns regarding global disease surveillance networks. This legislation has not been enacted.

As demonstrated during the recent H1N1 pandemic, domestic disease surveillance has been inadequate. The United States does not have the diagnostic testing capabilities required, and has a fragmented surveillance network. The Administration has developed plans to increase global surveillance disease networks; this progress on the international front is the reason our grade is as high as it is. However, the domestic situation needs attention and improvement. Currently our government cannot determine how many people have contracted a disease even during a pandemic such as H1N1, which was foreseen for many months. That is not acceptable. This grade could be raised by developing a strategy and an implementation and funding plan for a more robust disease detection and reporting network within the United States.

**Propose a new action plan for achieving universal adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention.**

*World at Risk recommendation 2-4*

In December 2009, the National Security Council released the *National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats*. The Chair and Vice Chair commend this ground-breaking initiative that provides national guidance for integrated actions intended to prevent biological terrorism and other significant outbreaks of infectious disease. During the past year, the U.S. Department of State has held a number of productive international meetings in preparation for the 2011 Biological Warfare Convention (BWC) 7th Review Conference. We were pleased to see the Administration’s rejection of efforts to restart BWC Protocol negotiations, recognizing that it is virtually impossible to verify compliance with the spread of dual-use advanced biotechnology around the world. However, U.S. policy on biological weapons cannot rest solely on opposition of the BWC Protocol. In order to provide leadership at the 2011 BWC Conference, the United States will have to take the necessary steps at home to enhance its ability to prevent biological terrorism, such as passage and rapid implementation of the *WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009*. To earn an A on this recommendation the U.S. Department of State must develop a full action plan for increasing international adherence to the biological weapons ban.

**Develop a national strategy for advancing bioforensic capabilities.**

*World at Risk recommendation 1-2*

An Interagency Bioforensics Strategy has been finalized and approved by the U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy and exceeds the criteria stated in the Commission’s recommendations. Implementation is underway and expected to be completed early in 2010. These steps should be incorporated into the White House strategy for prevention of biothreats.
Nuclear Risks

Implement a comprehensive policy toward Pakistan.
World at Risk recommendation 6

In *World at Risk*, the Commission recommended that the President and Congress should implement a comprehensive policy that engages Pakistan and other countries to eliminate terrorist safe havens, secure nuclear and biological materials, counter and defeat extremist ideology, and constrain a nascent nuclear arms race in Asia. Although significant action has been taken towards these ends, the situation in Pakistan continues to deteriorate and remains precarious. Because the long term impact of these initiatives cannot be realistically assessed at this point, the Chair and Vice Chair, therefore, provide an incomplete grade and the following recognition of what has been done and what remains to be completed.

Congress and the Administration took an important step in this regard by passing the *Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009*, which provides $7.5 billion in aid to Pakistan over five years, tripling economic aid to the country and seeking to balance motivation of the military to address urgent security threats to the United States and Pakistan alike with substantial support for the country’s people and civilian institutions. President Obama has given this priority attention to the region, appointing a high-profile envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and encouraging Pakistan, to press harder to eliminate al Qaeda safe havens. The Pakistani Army has stepped up military efforts along the border of Afghanistan, and the Chair and Vice Chair commend the Administration for continuing efforts to target the al Qaeda leadership in the region.

As part of a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan, President Obama has called for “an effective partnership with Pakistan.” Militarily, the “surge” of troops to Afghanistan coupled with increased support for Pakistan’s offensive against al Qaeda and Taliban extremists in previously ungoverned territory constitutes what General David Petraeus has called a “hammer and anvil” strategy. For that strategy to be successful, the “hammer” and the “anvil” must both be continued at the same time to provide coordinated and simultaneous pressure on both sides of the border. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and leaders of the U.S. intelligence community have been frequent visitors to their counterparts in this undertaking. Moreover, we applaud the Administration for sustaining an accelerated campaign to eliminate a large number of al Qaeda leaders in the area. On the ideological front, the latest Pew Global Attitudes poll shows overall trend lines improving on Pakistani attitudes towards al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban. Indeed, the poll shows that unfavorable views towards the Taliban and al Qaeda have nearly doubled since last year to 70% and 61% respectively.

However, while these efforts are important, Pakistan remains in crisis, with an increasing number of bold attacks on well-guarded military, police, and UN targets. We are pleased that the Pakistani government appears to be taking serious military action to combat insurgents, but other factors contributing to its precarious position have not been satisfactorily addressed. Pakistan is reportedly expanding its arsenal of nuclear weapons, a development that heightens concerns about the security of its nuclear stockpile and fuels, and which would run counter to another recommendation of the Commission, developing a policy to contain a nascent nuclear arms race in South Asia.

The U.S. Department of State has expanded efforts to secure biological research laboratories that possess stocks of dangerous pathogens and to promote a culture of biosafety in Pakistan. It is beginning to work with
the U.S. Department of Defense on this front, but further interagency coordination, especially with the intelligence community, is needed to adequately address this risk.

A good grade on Pakistan will require improvements on several fronts, including military success as measured by secured territory and elimination of al Qaeda safe havens; development success, as measured by numbers of hospitals, roads, power plants, and schools (with well-trained teachers), as well as by rising literacy rates (particularly among women in the tribal areas); and ideological success as measured by improvement in Pakistani views of the United States (currently among the lowest in the world with only 16 percent favorability, according to recent Pew Global Attitudes surveys).

Work with Russia to reduce dangers of WMD.

President Obama has made relations with Russia a priority, focusing especially on cooperation in combating nuclear danger. The results so far, however, are limited, as the Russian government has proved a difficult and often reluctant partner. At the July Obama-Medvedev summit, the two leaders endorsed a number of ongoing initiatives that the Commission had recommended, including (1) deepening their commitments to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); (2) strengthening the ability of other nations to implement UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540; (3) broadening long-term cooperation to further increase the level of security of nuclear facilities around the world; (4) sustaining nuclear security upgrades in Russia; (5) expanding capabilities to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive substances; and (6) working jointly to repatriate research reactor highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Permanent working groups have been established to accelerate these efforts.

We are pleased about Russian support for the United States in securing passage of UNSCR 1887 on nonproliferation and disarmament, toughening UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea, and joining the United States in leading in the upcoming Global Nuclear Security Summit, where Russia has agreed to host the follow-up. In addition, the United States and Russia have worked together in achieving an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement on Russia’s International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk.

The Chair and Vice Chair lament the failure of the Administration to anticipate the urgent necessity for extending important verification and monitoring provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) prior to the treaty’s lapse on December 5, 2009. As of this writing, these provisions have not been extended. Though negotiations continue with the hope of reaching an agreement soon, the negotiation of technical annexes and the need to then gain legislative approval in both countries will further delay the reinstitution of an important facet of the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, something the Commission noted was crucial to lessening the threat of nuclear terrorism. The Administration can raise this grade by taking concrete steps to further GICNT and PSI, by reinvigorating cooperative biological threat reduction programs in Russia, by making progress on limiting fissile nuclear material, and by completing a post-START verification and monitoring mechanism.

Strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

The Chair and Vice Chair applaud President Obama’s leadership in putting the danger of nuclear proliferation
and nuclear terrorism at the top of his national security agenda, as evidenced by his first foreign policy speech abroad in Prague last April, his chairmanship of the UN Security Council in September, and his initiative to assemble key heads of state in Washington this spring for a Global Nuclear Security Summit. After many years of essentially no growth in the IAEA budget, the United States succeeded in reaching agreement on a real, if modest, funding boost (2.7%) and increased its own 2009 voluntary contribution by 20 percent. The Administration also won approval of a UN Security Council Resolution reaffirming the importance of nonproliferation and endorsing many of the Commission’s recommendations.

We are also pleased that the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution authorizing the Director General to conclude and implement a Russian proposal to establish a reserve of low enriched uranium (LEU) for supply to the IAEA for its member states. Other efforts, including seeking measures to restrict the spread of dangerous enrichment and reprocessing technologies, are ongoing but have yet to bear fruit. Much must still be done to enhance the IAEA’s authorities. The Administration needs to report on how well the IAEA is meeting its own nuclear safeguards timeliness detection goals, whether these goals are tough enough to provide timely warning, and where the IAEA is unlikely to be able to get timely warning of a military diversion under any circumstances. Also, despite some effort in Congress, the government has yet to implement Title V of the Nonproliferation Act of 1978 by reporting on U.S. cooperation with developing nations to develop non-nuclear alternative energy sources and to create a non-nuclear energy peace corps. Finally, we believe that Congress and the President may need to further reform the oversight of the approval of proposed nuclear cooperative agreements. The nuclear proliferation assessments that must accompany proposed agreements, such as the U.S.-Russian civilian nuclear cooperative agreement, deserve greater attention and review by Congress.

The Administration can improve its grade on this front by taking concrete steps, including supporting congressional initiatives where appropriate, to strengthen the safeguards system, to expand near-real time and wide-area surveillance, to require foreign visitors to IAEA safeguarded sites to be registered and accounted for, and most importantly, to make progress in reversing trends in North Korea and Iran. The Administration can also improve its grade by taking concrete steps to constrain the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. We also reaffirm the language in World at Risk that the United States should discourage, to the extent possible, the use of financial incentives in the promotion of nuclear power.

Review cooperative nuclear security programs.

World at Risk recommendation 4

President Obama took a significant step in announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years and in April 2010 will host a Global Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. An inter-agency review of nuclear cooperative security programs is underway and implementation plans are being developed. While indications to date have been positive, much remains to be done. Funding for programs like the Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which actually decreased for fiscal year 2010, will have to be increased if the President’s four-year goal is to be reached. Decisions on key positions for moving these programs forward, particularly in the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Agency, have been delayed. Appropriate resources for nuclear cooperative security programs, completion of detailed implementation plans, and progress at the Global Nuclear Security Summit, will be needed to raise this grade and to achieve President Obama’s stated goals.
**Government Reform**

Reform congressional oversight to better address intelligence, homeland security, and crosscutting 21st-century national security missions.  

*World at Risk recommendation 9*

Congress has a responsibility not only to authorize and appropriate necessary national security missions, but also to provide effective oversight of those efforts. Regular oversight hearings should be held, but should avoid duplication and disjointedness. Congress has failed to take even the relatively easy first steps to consolidate oversight authority of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The estimated number of committees and subcommittees that oversee DHS ranges from 82 to 108. Virtually no progress has been made since consolidation was first recommended by the 9/11 Commission in 2004. The Commission also recommended that Congress should create an Intelligence Subcommittee in the Appropriations Committee in both chambers with jurisdiction over the National Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program budgets. Limited action has been taken on this recommendation. To improve this failing grade, the leadership of both parties, and in both chambers, must make the public commitment to begin this needed consolidation. Then they must begin to implement the commitment in 2010, even if it takes several years to complete.

Implement education and training programs to recruit and retain the next generation of national security experts.

*World at Risk recommendation 11*

The unwillingness of successive administrations and congresses to address in any responsible manner the growing shortfall in our national security workforce—a problem identified as far back as the 1999 Hart-Rudman report—represents a fundamental failure of government. This shortage in personnel will significantly diminish the nation’s ability to address a growing number of security issues. Several of the necessary programs, such as Boren scholarships funded by the National Security Education Program, already exist, but they lack sufficient scale and continuity of funding and political support in the Administration and Congress to meet growing personnel shortages in intelligence, defense, space, security, and at the national laboratories.

Proposals like that of the Director of National Intelligence to establish an Intelligence Officer Training Corps, modeled on the military’s ROTC program, are critical to provide future scientific and engineering personnel as well as linguistic and area studies for developing capable analysts. While the use of contract personnel fills some vacancies, the practice is overly expensive, creates no lasting organizational expertise, and is, at best, a short-term solution to a long-term problem. What needs to be done is known and the national consequences of not hiring a sufficient number of qualified individuals are understood. Therefore, the decision of both the Administration and Congress to not adequately fund needed recruitment and retention programs, to include joint-duty assignments, is an inexcusable failure. To judge this situation as anything other than an abject failure, both the Administration and Congress must commit to spending what is required to recruit, hire, train, and retrain a qualified, motivated national security workforce.
Integrate, under a single overarching strategy, efforts to coordinate, integrate, and deliver foreign assistance, public diplomacy, and strategic communications.

World at Risk recommendation 12

The Commission recommended that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the U.S. Agency for International Development and other offices, should take the lead in building organic capability within the civilian agencies of the U.S. government to deliver foreign assistance, public diplomacy, and strategic communications. In May, following a 60-day review, President Obama created a Global Engagement Directorate in the NSC to drive comprehensive policies that integrate diplomacy, communications, international development and assistance, and domestic engagement and outreach in pursuit of a host of national security objectives, including those related to homeland security. The U.S. Department of State is working on a congressionally mandated Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) to guide diplomatic and development efforts, and in August, the president issued a new Presidential Study Directive (PSD) to review U.S. global development programs toward a more strategic and coordinated development policy. Interim QDDR results are expected to be released in February, followed by issuance of the PSD. Completion of the QDDR is tentatively expected in July 2010. Congress is also weighing in with introduction of the Initiating Foreign Assistance Reform Act of 2009 in the House and the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act of 2009 in the Senate. These are all positive steps, but the extent to which these efforts result in a coordinated overarching strategy, and particularly the extent to which public diplomacy and strategic communications are included in these largely development focused reviews, remains to be seen.

Designate a White House principal advisor for WMD proliferation and terrorism.

World at Risk recommendation 8

The Administration adopted the Commission’s recommendation by appointing a WMD coordinator. However, this step has not fully addressed the reasoning behind the Commission’s recommendation. In World at Risk, the Commission expressed concern that there is a long history of cases in which policy tradeoffs were required between nonproliferation and geopolitical interests. In virtually all cases, economic and geopolitical considerations trumped nonproliferation concerns. In order to ensure that nonproliferation concerns are fully heard and understood, it is critical that an official with sufficient senior-level interagency authority and direct access to the president be in charge of WMD proliferation and terrorism. No such official currently exists. To improve this grade and to truly ensure the protection of the United States, such an official should be appointed as rapidly as possible.

Create a more efficient and effective policy coordination structure by restructuring the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC).

World at Risk recommendation 8

The President integrated the NSC and HSC shortly after taking office and is to be commended for taking this first important step. If the United States is going to successfully pull together the various departments and agencies of the federal government, integration must begin at the top. Next, however, the executive branch faces the infinitely more difficult and infinitely more important challenge of improving interagency cooperation. On that front, there has been little progress over the past year, or any meaningful efforts by Congress to drive this larger issue.
Citizen and Community Preparedness

Practice greater openness of public information so that citizens better understand the WMD threat.

World at Risk recommendation 13

There is evidence that the current Administration is taking positive steps to be open with the public about the WMD threat. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s ready.gov website with its links to other government agencies has been improved and has become a comprehensive source of information for citizens interested in preparing ahead of time in the event of an emergency, be it a natural disaster, pandemic, or WMD attack. In developing the soon to be released first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (a guide to homeland security policies, programs, and missions), DHS included an on-line exchange with the U.S. public as well as outreach to 11,000 mission partners from the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. In July 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano established the Homeland Security Advisory Task Force to assess the effectiveness of the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System in informing the public about terrorist threats and communicating protective measures within government and throughout the private sector. The Task Force recommended changes to the color-coded system, but no action has yet been taken. These are significant efforts to reengage and inform the American citizenry. However, further thoughtful work is needed if the American people are to become decidedly more aware of and prepared for the threats the nation faces.

Work with a consortium of state and local governments to improve preparedness in the event of a WMD attack.

World at Risk recommendation 13

In January 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano issued a series of Action Directives, including reviews of current state and local intelligence-sharing as well as state, local, and tribal integration. The DHS 2010 budget request also seeks to establish an Office of Stakeholder Relations, which would act as the primary conduit between DHS and state, local, and tribal governments. In addition, in March 2009, FEMA released the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, which provides planning guidance and advocates for a hybrid planning system to better link together federal, state, local, and tribal officials. The federal government must continue these efforts and become a stronger advocate for citizen, community, state, and regional preparedness to effectively respond to recurring natural disasters. This should include partnering with the private sector and non-governmental organizations, particularly through organizations such as Business Executives for National Security (BENS). By properly organizing and preparing for natural disasters, similar to the organizational model used by BENS, communities and states will acquire most of the capabilities needed to respond in the event of a man-made disaster, or WMD attack, and clearly identify those capabilities that must be reinforced. Until all states have reached a level of preparedness appropriate for their needs, DHS and Congress must become more effective advocates for preparedness through an ongoing effort—and that level of preparedness must be sustained.
World at Risk Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing domestic measures to prevent bioterrorism: (1) conduct a comprehensive review of the domestic program to secure dangerous pathogens, (2) develop a national strategy for advancing bioforensic capabilities, (3) tighten government oversight of high-containment laboratories, (4) promote a culture of security awareness in the life sciences community, and (5) enhance the nation’s capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the international level to prevent biological weapons proliferation and terrorism: (1) press for an international conference of countries with major biotechnology industries to promote biosecurity, (2) conduct a global assessment of biosecurity risks, (3) strengthen global disease surveillance networks, and (4) propose a new action plan for achieving universal adherence to and effective national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, for adoption at the next review conference in 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The United States should work internationally toward strengthening the nonproliferation regime, reaffirming the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons by (1) imposing a range of penalties for NPT violations and withdrawal from the NPT that shift the burden of proof to the state under review for noncompliance; (2) ensuring access to nuclear fuel, at market prices to the extent possible, for non-nuclear states that agree not to develop sensitive fuel cycle capabilities and are in full compliance with international obligations; (3) strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency, to include identifying the limitations to its safeguarding capabilities, and providing the agency with the resources and authorities needed to meet its current and expanding mandate; (4) promoting the further development and effective implementation of counterproliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; (5) orchestrating consensus that there will be no new states, including Iran and North Korea, possessing uranium enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing capability; (6) working in concert with others to do everything possible to promote and maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing; (7) working toward a global agreement on the definition of “appropriate” and “effective” nuclear security and accounting systems as legally obligated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; and (8) discouraging, to the extent possible, the use of financial incentives in the promotion of civil nuclear power.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The new President should undertake a comprehensive review of cooperative nuclear security programs, and should develop a global strategy that accounts for the worldwide expansion of the threat and the restructuring of our relationship with Russia from that of donor and recipient to a cooperative partnership.
RECOMMENDATION 5: As a top priority, the next administration must stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. In the case of Iran, this requires the permanent cessation of all of Iran’s nuclear weapons–related efforts. In the case of North Korea, this requires the complete abandonment and dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. If, as appears likely, the next administration seeks to stop these programs through direct diplomatic engagement with the Iranian and North Korean governments, it must do so from a position of strength, emphasizing both the benefits to them of abandoning their nuclear weapons programs and the enormous costs of failing to do so. Such engagement must be backed by the credible threat of direct action in the event that diplomacy fails.

RECOMMENDATION 6: The next President and Congress should implement a comprehensive policy toward Pakistan that works with Pakistan and other countries to (1) eliminate terrorist safe havens through military, economic, and diplomatic means; (2) secure nuclear and biological materials in Pakistan; (3) counter and defeat extremist ideology; and (4) constrain a nascent nuclear arms race in Asia.

RECOMMENDATION 7: The next U.S. administration should work with the Russian government on initiatives to jointly reduce the danger of the use of nuclear and biological weapons, including by (1) extending some of the essential verification and monitoring provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that are scheduled to expire in 2009; (2) advancing cooperation programs such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and the Proliferation Security Initiative; (3) sustaining security upgrades at sensitive sites in Russia and elsewhere, while finding common ground on further reductions in stockpiles of excess highly enriched uranium; (4) jointly encouraging China, Pakistan, and India to announce a moratorium on the further production of nuclear fissile materials for nuclear weapons and to reduce existing nuclear military deployments and stockpiles; and (5) offering assistance to other nations, such as Pakistan and India, in achieving nuclear confidence-building measures similar to those that the United States and the USSR followed for most of the Cold War.

RECOMMENDATION 8: The President should create a more efficient and effective policy coordination structure by designating a White House principal advisor for WMD proliferation and terrorism and restructuring the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council.

RECOMMENDATION 9: Congress should reform its oversight both structurally and substantively to better address intelligence, homeland security, and crosscutting 21st-century national security missions, such as the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.

RECOMMENDATION 10: Accelerate integration of effort among the counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and law enforcement communities to address WMD proliferation and terrorism issues; strengthen expertise in the nuclear and biological fields; prioritize pre-service and in-service training and retention of people with critical scientific, language, and foreign area skills; and ensure that the threat posed by biological weapons remains among the highest national intelligence priorities for collection and analysis.

RECOMMENDATION 11: The United States must build a national security workforce for the 21st century.
RECOMMENDATION 12: U.S. counterterrorism strategy must more effectively counter the ideology behind WMD terrorism. The United States should develop a more coherent and sustained strategy and capabilities for global ideological engagement to prevent future recruits, supporters, and facilitators.

RECOMMENDATION 13: The next administration must work to openly and honestly engage the American citizen, encouraging a participatory approach to meeting the challenges of the new century.

For full text of the report, visit www.preventwmd.gov.
About the Commission

Congress established the bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism to address the grave threat that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses to the United States.

The Commission is a legacy of both the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission). The reports produced by these Commissions explained to the American people how and why the U.S. government failed to discover that terrorists, operating from Afghanistan, were infiltrating the United States in order to use a most unconventional resource—commercial airplanes—as weapons that would kill thousands of people. Those Commissions looked at the past. This Commission looks to the future.

The Commission’s report, World at Risk, was published in December 2008 with the finding that the U.S. government has yet to fully adapt to the current circumstance of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

Recognizing the urgency in this assessment, Congress took the unprecedented step of authorizing an additional year of work by the Commission to assist Congress and the Administration to turn these recommendations into actions. Specifically, the report identifies 13 recommendations consisting of 49 actions that Congress and the Administration should take to change the trajectory of risk.

The full report is available at www.preventwmd.gov.
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism

Original Commissioners
Senator Bob Graham, Commission Chairman
Senator Jim Talent, Commission Vice Chairman
Graham T. Allison
Robin Cleveland
Stephen G. Rademaker
Congressman Timothy Roemer
Wendy R. Sherman
Henry D. Sokolski
Rich Verma

Commission Staff, 2009—2010
Colonel Randall Larsen, USAF (Retired), Executive Director
Lindsey R. Neas, Chief of Staff
Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Science Advisor
David Lampen, Technology Assistant
Jay Lavender, Communications Advisor
Carmen MacDougall, Communications Director
Susan Perez, Administrative Assistant
Sara E. Rubin, Communications Associate
Daniel P. Sullivan, Senior Professional Staff
Peter D. Zimmerman, Science Advisor

The Commission would like to thank Jamie Gorelick, Partner, and Keith Murphy, Associate, of WilmerHale for serving as General Counsel and Associate Counsel.